Plaintiffs, )
v. ) ) ) )
Defendants.
) Hearing On Order To Show Cause

## Transcript

of Seeking Preliminary Injunction

RESORTS INTERNATIONAL ) )

HOLDINGS, LLC, et als,

## Place: Atlantic County Criminal Courthouse 4997 Unami Boulevard Mays Landing, NJ 08330

Date: May 17, 2013

## BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE RAYMOND A. BATTEN, P.J. Ch.
TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
NOAH J. GOLD, ESQ., (Lum Drasco \& Positan, LLC)

## APPEARANCES:

WAYNE J. POSITAN, ESQ.; STEVEN J. EISENSTEIN, ESQ.; and SCOTT REISER, ESQ.
(Lum Drasco \& Positan, LLC)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
THOMAS R. CURTIN, ESQ., (Graham Curtin)
GILBERT L. BROOKS, ESQ. (Duane Morris - Cherry Hill)
TARIQ MUNDIYA, ESQ. and DAN C. KOZUSKO, ESQ. (Willkie Farr \& Gallagher) Attorneys for Defendants

[^0](None this date)

Evidence:
(None this date)

## Argument/Summation:

| Mr. Curtin | $11 / 50$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Mr. Mundiya | $31 / 40 / 76$ |
| Mr. Brooks | $35 / 48$ |
| Mr. Positan | $54 / 79$ |

Ruling/Decision:
The Court
(May 17, 2013. Digital recording at Time Index 1:33:01 as follows:)

THE COURT: Please be seated, everyone. Good afternoon and welcome.

MR. CURTIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
MR. POSITAN: Good afternoon.
THE COURT: We're on the record?
THE CLERK: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Bear with - Let me get organized here for just a moment.

We convene in the matter of Rational Group US Holdings, Incorporated and Oldford Group Limited v. Resorts International Holdings, LLC; Eric Matejevich Am I pronouncing that correctly?

MR. CURTIN: Matich (sic) - Matejevich, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Matejevich? Thank you. Irwin Apartment Trust, et al, and it is docket ATL-C-43-13. Counsel, your appearances, please.

MR. POSITAN: For the plaintiffs Rational Group Holdings and Oldford Group Limited, Wayne J. Positan, Steven Eisenstein, and Scott Reiser of the firm of Lum Drasco \& Positan.

MR. CURTIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is Tom Curtin. I'm from Graham Curtin of

Morristown, and I represent the defendants together with my colleagues who I will introduce to you, who have been admitted pro hac vice. At least their application is pending.

THE COURT: I have it right here, and we'll do that in first order.

MR. CURTIN: And my adversary graciously has consented to their admission from Wilkie Farr \& Gallagher, Tariq Mundiya and Dan Kozusko.

THE COURT: Welcome.
MR. MUNDIYA: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. BROOKS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Gil Brooks of the firm of Duane Morris appearing on behalf of the defendants.

THE COURT: The Gil Brooks of the certification, I gather?

MR. BROOKS: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. POSITAN: Your Honor, if I may please, if Mr. Brooks is going to speak I'm going to have an objection to that given his factual affidavit filed. I think he's made himself a fact witness in the case.

THE COURT: Was there any inclination to have Mr. Brooks speaking, Mr. Curtin?

MR. CURTIN: My inclination, Judge, is that
given this is the first opportunity we've had to respond to the allegations made by the plaintiffs in this case that the Court - there are others, there are people other than me that might have information that the Court might inquire, and if there are issues that are a concern to the Court of Mr. Positan and his client, he is $-\mathrm{Mr} .-$ he is available to speak. I don't anticipate him making a presentation.

THE COURT: So noted. Mr. Positan, your objection is noted and we'll see where we go.

Let us first address that, that motion. I have the motion. I have it with me here at the bench.

Mr. Positan, there is no objection to the motion for admission of Mr. Mundiya and Mr. Kozusko pro hac vice?

MR. POSITAN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I sign the order, and we'll get that filed, counsel, in due course and get everyone copies. The order is filed - signed.

Counsel, a few other preliminary matters that won't take long. First, I want to share with all of you that on May 13th when $I$ entered the initial restraints and scheduled the return for today at 1:30 it was certainly not my intention then, nor is it now, to pull or have pulled two past presidents of the New

Jersey State Bar Association from the last afternoon of the New Jersey State Bar Association convention. That is extremely fortuitous. I acknowledge that you're here. I also want to acknowledge to you that I know what you just left, I assume.

MR. POSITAN: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, Tom Curtin and I spent lunch yesterday at the past presidents lunch and dinner last night at the installation dinner, and we were both together at the cocktail party the night before; and also I succeeded Tom as the New Jersey delegate to the ABA, and he succeeded me as the Board of Governors representative from the Third Circuit. So we've worked very closely together on things that are good for the profession. THE COURT: May I ask MR. POSITAN: But that's the greatness of the adversarial system.

THE COURT: May I ask whether, as a result of those discussions, any matters have been resolved?
(Laughter)
MR. POSITAN: Well, we can't bring settlement discussions before the Court, Your Honor. MR. CURTAIN: Well, I did agree to pay the bar tab, Your Honor.

MR. POSITAN: That's because they gave us
free tokens though, Tom.
THE COURT: In any event, I acknowledge that you are here under that circumstance.

First, I also want to acknowledge Mr. Positan's objection to what he characterized as late submissions by the defendants, and I believe they took the form of certifications if I'm not mistaken, and I've not had the opportunity -

MR. POSITAN: Contracts actually, Your Honor, that were referred to -

THE COURT: Two other -
MR. POSITAN: - in their other papers, which I have also objected to as being irrelevant and extraneous. So that's part of my argument.

THE COURT: I understand. As is typically my habit, I read everything. So I've read them. I will also share with counsel that it is my view, at least at the moment, that the content of those contracts is not dispositive here today, and I'm satisfied that as the oral argument goes forward and I make my findings you'll be satisfied to that effect.

I also note that there are objections to the four certifications provided by Messrs. Perskie, Hurley, Auriemma, and Catania and, again, I've read those as well. Counsel can be free to comment upon
those as you choose, but I'm also relatively certain my mind may change, but I don't envision any such change - I'm relatively certain that while those affidavits or certifications are certainly interesting to read and they are arguably relevant, they are also not dispositive as relates to the decision that $I$ perceive needs to be made here today.

So to the extent of those objections I don't perceive prejudice visiting, visiting anyone. I don't know that - Well, I'll probably hear from Mr. Curtin in that regard, but $I$ don't know that this Court is necessarily bound by the content of those certifications.

And we've already addressed the contracts. Counsel, I believe that covers at least the preliminary matters that I wanted to address. Before we actually get into the oral argument, do any of you have anything else preliminarily?

MR. CURTIN: I don't, Your Honor.
MR. POSITAN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have one more matter, and it actually relates to the contract and pertains to two matters that neither of you have raised in your pleadings. And if you'll indulge me, I'd like to direct your attention to the contract and specifically
page 47, and it pertains to Article 7, specifically section 7.1, termination - and I gather we'll be discussing that section quite a bit this afternoon and specifically 7.1, its introductory sentence and then down to section (c). And reading the introductory language of 7.1 with section (c) it reads, and I'll quote, (reading:)
"This agreement may be terminated at any time prior to closing."

And then down to (c),
"By seller's representative or buyer. If any gaming authority has made a final determination that such gaming authority will not issue to buyer all gaming approvals or if buyer withdraws unless subsequent to the termination of this agreement pursuant to section," - this section "7.1, its application for gaming approval;" Is there a clause or a phrase missing there? Do you perceive?

MR. CURTIN: I think we'll get you at least a response, Your Honor. I'm not sure an answer, but a response at least. We'll have the lawyer who did the contract itself -

THE COURT: In any event, let me share with counsel as I read that, and I have read it and reread
it, $I$ am consistently left with the sense that there was likely at some point in time a clause that followed, and I'm wondering what that may have been, and $I$ would appreciate your thoughts in that regard. Next, if we turn the page to page 48, section $7.1(f)$, same introductory language as begins section 7.1 on page 47 , but after the colon we flip to page 48 under (f), (reading:)
"By the seller's representative if buyer has breached any representation, warranty, covenant, or agreement on the part of the buyer set forth in the agreement which, one, would result in the failure of a condition set forth in section 6.3(a), (b), or (c) hereof,"
and if you flip back to section 6.3(a), (b), or (c), my copy at least, and I would trust that your copy, does not contain a section $6.3(c)$. I'll say it again if you'd like.

MR. MUNDIYA: No, I - Your Honor, I think that probably should read 6.1(c). It may be a typographical error. We'll confirm that. That's probably a typo.

THE COURT: In any event, I'll appreciate your thoughts. And it may be of no moment, but -

MR. MUNDIYA: Right. But we, we will get
back to you on that.
THE COURT: That's fine.
With that, this is the return on the order to show cause. Mr. Curtin, I'm happy to hear from you first.

MR. CURTIN: Judge, thank you for this opportunity to present information to you on behalf of my clients. With your permission what I'd like to do is to be able to address, have me the address the issues that relate to the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the return of the order to show cause for today, and to the extent that there are other issues my colleagues will either respond to them or present with regard to any issue that may arise either raised by the Court or in response to Mr. Positan's argument if that's okay.

THE COURT: That's fine.
MR. CURTIN: So let me start first by hopefully - although Your Honor has just corrected what may be an error or mistake unnoticed by both sides - that before you you have a series - you have a complaint, a verified complaint on an order to show cause, briefs, exhibits, and a variety of documents including the certifications to which you earlier referred, which we filed, those of Steven P. Perskie,

Thomas N. Auriemma, Frank Catania, Sr., Louis R. Hurley, Eric Matejevich, and Gilbert Brooks.

I want to begin where $I$ think we should.
That is I understand that it's not my responsibility today, I don't have the burden today to show that the plaintiffs have satisfied their obligations under the four-prong test, but that $I$ do have the obligation to come forward and to present information to you that would permit you to make a decision with regard to whether or not the plaintiffs have satisfied the obligations of Crowe v. DeGioia. And I thought while we're caught up to a large degree in a big world picture, a big argument between casino stars - excuse me, PokerStars and our client, that maybe we ought to see what others perhaps more informed would say about what we see are issues that the Court should look at today with regard to all of the issues on the order to show cause and temporary restraints. And I point the Court - aware of the fact that there's been an objection to the Perskie and other certifications - to paragraph 12 of the Mr. Perskie's certification. THE COURT: So the record is complete, a former colleague of mine here in Vicinage I. MR. CURTIN: I'm aware of that, Your Honor. MR. POSITAN: Well, Your Honor, I - and I do
object to that. I think for a retired judge of this vicinage to introduce the kind of affidavit he did, telling you how you should rule on statutory construction, raises some serious questions. And, you know, we have had no opportunity to get into his affidavit or any other affidavits about conflicts of interest. Mr. Catania, for example, I am told this morning, represented my client PokerStars at one time, provided legal advice to them. So we have two questionable affidavits. Where we go from there and what these respective interests are, but to have a retired judge - and he has his retired judge information prominently displayed here from his web site - to offer that in this vicinage THE COURT: Even, even with that MR. POSITAN: - raises some serious questions.

THE COURT: But even without that, in this region that name is not unknown to very many people. I wanted to offer the comment so that the record is complete.

MR. CURTIN: Judge, with regard to that let me proceed. I understand Mr. Positan has made his objection.

Mr. Perskie has outlined, I think, for us on
our behalf and for the Court's information and persuasion, I hope, several provisions, but I want to point specifically for what we're doing today that Mr. Perskie says, beginning with paragraph 12, and I'm reading, (reading:)
"In my experience it is common and, in fact, the norm for an agreement involving the purchase and sale of interests in Atlantic City casinos to include a closing date that provides for closing to occur after the issuance of an Interim Casino Authorization by the Commission such as the provision in the agreement that is currently before the court. In my experience such a closing date provision has always been considered consistent with the waiting period requirements of N.J.S.A. 5:12-95.1(2) (a)."

And in paragraph 13 he says, (reading:)
"In my experience it is also common for an agreement involving the purchase and sale of an interest in an Atlantic City casino to include a separate termination provision such as is included in the agreement before the Court that would limit the time period during which the proposed buyer must complete the regulatory process and thus providing for a termination of
the agreement within a specified time or a specified date. As long as such provision would not purport to afford any buyer the opportunity to 'close' or 'settle' on the purchase before the 121-day regulatory review period had expired, such a termination provision is neither inconsistent with any of the interests of the regulatory agencies nor violative of the provisions of the ICA statute. Rather, such a provision merely reflects the negotiated positions of the buyer and seller, a mutually acceptable determination that is beyond the interests of the regulatory process."

And finally in paragraph 14, (reading:)
"While I have no information and would not speculate with regard to the perceived interests of the respective parties in the instant transaction, including a termination date in their agreement, I would observe for the Court's attention that the economics of the casino industry in New Jersey have definite 'calendar rhythm' in the sense that the summer season, which is, of course, the busiest time of year, frequently mandates the schedule for transfers of interests in casino licenses and other
transactions in order to preserve for all concerned the advantages and summer businesses and full attention of the operator during that period." So says the author of the Casino Control statute that has been working quite well for a number of years.

Finally, -
MR. POSITAN: May I address that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I'm sorry?
MR. POSITAN: Could I address the qualifications of this testimony on somebody who is not a fact witness, who is not - What is he? An expert witness? Has he been paid for this testimony? And what are we doing here? We don't have an Appellate Division ruling here. Is he speaking as a retired judge? Is he speaking - What is he speaking as? He's not involved in this case.

THE COURT: I think those questions, Mr. Curtain, are directed to you more than the Court.

MR. CURTIN: We - This is our first opportunity to respond to an ex parte application made to you last week when we had no opportunity to respond to the allegations made by the plaintiff. We were not given notice. We had to present to you as much
factual information that we possibly could in a relatively short period of time in which we sought to inform the Court with as much information as we could find. We went, selected a number of experts who have more knowledge on the subject than I do and, respectfully, probably more knowledge on the subject than the Court has or Mr. Positan or his colleagues have.

THE COURT: No doubt.
MR. CURTIN: So we are, we are at this stage, on the return of an order to show cause seeking to restrain us from operating our business, pulling out all the stops, and I think that -

THE COURT: I don't know that the restraint seeks to prevent you from operating the business.

MR. POSITAN: It does not.
THE COURT: In any event -
MR. CURTIN: In any event, put that in the column of an exercised Irishman trying to make a point.

The selection of the experts that we selected - and this is the first, the first - I shouldn't say that. This is an unexpected objection to the qualifications of somebody. I know that there was an objection written by Mr. Positan to the use of
these, but $I$ think you need information that's sensible, that's reliable, that's dependable that the Court can rely on in terms of hearing my argument. Whether or not you choose to regard or disregard that argument, the qualifications of the individual, you know who it is, you know what his reputation is, and you can use that, ignore it, or use it or otherwise. But I think it's important for you to know that at least the expert in this area has said that what we have done, what this contract says is the typical standard agreement that is utilized in the casino industry and has been for some time in his experience. THE COURT: You would acknowledge, I gather - and I think this goes more to Mr. Positan's objection - that whatever the practice of the Casino Control Commission with regard to the substantive content of agreements to purchase casino interests is or may be, it's not binding upon this court here.

MR. CURTIN: I wasn't suggesting it was binding, but it certainly is informative, and I would hope that the Court would utilize that in other arguments and other evidence to come to a determination that today you are not - you're going to dissolve these restraints and permit us to move forward.

THE COURT: Again, I understand that this is your client's first opportunity to be here, and I am going to extend to both sides, but certainly you and your client, Mr. Curtin, the time that you want and I'll hear your arguments. I will not cramp your style, so to speak, in developing a record. I did indicate a little bit earlier, and it remains my sense, that the four certifications to which the objection was made, I've read them. They are interesting. They are arguably relevant. To this point they're not dispositive and should that change I'm certainly going to share the point at which I sense that may be the case with Mr. Positan so that he can build his record.

MR. POSITAN: Your Honor, if I also can correct the record here? This is not an ex parte proceeding. There was an original ex parte order, and that was - Then they were immediately notified. We had a second telephonic conference hearing, which is a matter of record, -

THE COURT: One day later.
MR. POSITAN: - and in the papers. So this not ex parte anymore, and then he wanted it moved it up until Tuesday, and we consented. Then he wanted it moved back to Friday, and we consented. So to say
this is ex parte today is incorrect.
THE COURT: But in fairness it is first opportunity for Mr. Curtin and his colleagues to appear here, stand on their feet and represent their client, and I recognize that.

MR. CURTIN: Thank you, Judge.
The second thing to see if $I$ can get us back to where, the real world discussion that $I$ think is important to my clients today, if I could point Your Honor's attention and counsels' attention to Mr. Matejevich's certification dated May 13th of 2013 and in particular paragraph 17.

THE COURT: Seven?
MR. CURTIN: Paragraph 17. And I, the reason I want you to consider this and to focus your, the Court's attention to this is there is a significant impact on the imposition of the temporary restraining order and any restraint that may follow. And the words that Mr. Makovitch - Matejevich, excuse me - utilizes here I think are helpful and will help shape my argument, and if you will permit me I will read, briefly read paragraph 17 because it depicts the climate in which this, these circumstances are occurring. He says, (reading:)
"At present the temporary restraining order is
preventing RIH from fulfilling its
responsibilities to its constituents, including owners, management, 1,743 employees, vendors and patrons of The Atlantic Club. Seller's responsibilities to its stakeholders is to review all options available and seek the best alternative. Seeking alternative buyers or partners will not cause chaos. It will be an orderly process with full disclosure of Rational's asserted claims. The sellers are prevented from taking steps to prepare The Atlantic Club for the advent of on-line gaming.

RIH and The Atlantic Club are at a standstill while its competition is busy pursing the economic opportunity that RHI (sic) helped to bring to Atlantic City by being the primary casino advocate for legalized on-line gaming in New Jersey. Time is short, and every day of delay is harmful. Rational is also waging a public relations campaign by filing its lawsuit and trumpeting the ex parte TRO secured last week. The press has caused significant employee, vendor, and customer uncertainty. Such
uncertainty is the last thing The Atlantic Club needs as we head into the summer season."

And he asks in the concluding paragraph that you eliminate or vacate the order which you previously entered.

So that's sort of where we are today, Your Honor, and we are - it's really a very critical time for Atlantic City. It's really a very critical time for our client, and it wants to be in a position where it remains viable and can compete.

What's happening in my view, Your Honor, and the view of my clients is what the plaintiffs are asking you to do is to require us to comply with - or requiring you or asking you to enforce a contract that we did not sign. We want to enforce the contract which we did sign, and it contains provisions that authorize us to do what we have done.

More particularly with regard to the events that have occurred over the last several days, they've asked you for an extraordinary remedy which arises out of an ordinary standard contract that was negotiated by sophisticated parties with powerhouse lawyers knowing the full import of the contents of those agreements, knowing what the provisions they wanted, what the provisions that they did not want. You're being asked in my view, Your Honor, and in the view of my clients to rewrite a contract that these parties
negotiated, the terms that they negotiated, the give-and-takes that they negotiated because the plaintiffs are unhappy with the contract that they have; and that's not your job, to reform or to rewrite agreements that sophisticated parties with sophisticated counsel experienced in this field are, are involved with.

The pleadings that we are dealing with here, Judge, as I read them at least, don't claim that there was a breach of the agreement. They don't claim that there's an ambiguity. They don't claim that there's fraud. They don't claim that - they don't actually claim that there's any dispute with the terms of the contract. There's a bunch of subjective arguments about how they, what they feel and how they feel they've been treated, but there are no allegations in my view, at least in my reading, that claim that we have breached this agreement, and without a breach there's no basis, despite their argument, for the for an injunction to occur without a breach of the agreement. We think the injunction provision limits is limited to that argument by agreement of the parties, not by a substituted agreement or judgment of the Court. In fact, -

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THE COURT: If I may, if I may interrupt?
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MR. CURTIN: Sure.
THE COURT: Just my sense is you and I are about to hear from Mr. Positan with regard to the events of March 26 th and the letter by Mr. Matejevich or an email by Matejevich and the language contained in the email and what that means. You don't have to address that now, but you raised the issue of breach, and I'm listening. So go ahead.

MR. CURTIN: Essentially what you're being asked to do is to rewrite this agreement to give the plaintiffs an exclusive option to purchase The Atlantic Club and asking The Atlantic Club to bear the risk and the uncertainty of the issuance of an ICA, the risk that we didn't bargain for. They bargained for, that PokerStars agreed, not Atlantic Club, to get their license in the required period of time. There is in our view, Judge, based upon what we've seen, particularly the certifications and the information that's, that is put forth in our pleadings, there is little or no likelihood of success here.

One of the questions we think you - we would hope that you will address today is whether or not the contract sets forth and specifies a date earlier than the 121st day after a completed application. It does not. That issue, I think the Court must look at in
connection with the request that's being made by the plaintiffs.

The closing date as defined in the agreement is specific and says that the closing date will be set after all approvals, not just the regulatory approvals but all approvals are made, and it sets forth a method for - a process for those approvals.

THE COURT: Three days.
MR. CURTIN: The closing -

THE COURT: Three business days.

MR. CURTIN: Excuse me.

THE COURT: Three business days.
MR. CURTIN: Yes, three business days.

And, Judge, some of this is responsive to things that we have read. So if - I'm not making them up, but there's some suggestion that this, there's a fixed closing date. This closing date floats. It's not a fixed day. It wasn't set in the contract. It now - it's now set - There's a format, and you've just seized on it, that is three days after their regulatory approval is met.

So the plaintiff claims in addition to this that the inclusion of a termination date establishes a closing date in violation of statute. It doesn't. I've indicated to you from the certifications of Mr.

Perskie and others our view that in fact there is no violation of any statute in connection with the inclusion of a termination date. The statute is there to protect the public, to give the regulatory authorities sufficient time to be able to do their inquiry to determine whether or not the candidate, the applicant is, is a suitable applicant for licensing in New Jersey.

The termination date, which seems to have created a significant dust-up in this case, was a right that we had. It was an outside date. It wasn't a date pulled from a hat. The parties negotiated that date. April 26th was not a date - it's not my birthday, it's not somebody else's birthday, it was a negotiated date. It was negotiated because it - the belief, as I would suggest to the Court, was that it provided a sufficient amount of time for the regulation process to begin. It gave the buyer an opportunity to be able to make its application, to pursue its application, and it gave either side the right to terminate after April 26th, an agreed upon date. For $I$ - for any reason, any or no reason either side could have, after that date, separated themselves from one another. Didn't like us, didn't like what they saw, wasn't moving well enough in New Jersey,
weren't getting a good feeling. It wasn't an automatic termination.

THE COURT: Didn't get IGaming.
MR. CURTIN: Pardon me?
THE COURT: Did not get iGaming.
MR. CURTIN: Right. Did not get it. It was not an automatic. It was, it had - there had to be an action on our part if we were going to take, take that step and we, in fact, do that. And it didn't in any way - there's no suggestion that it's limited the inquiry of the DEG (sic). The process continues even as we speak. And these, as I've suggested to you and the certifications have pointed up, that those termination provisions are common. You can see from the certification of Mr. Perskie and others how, how those provisions are standard provisions in operating agreements involving casinos regularly in New Jersey and certainly in Atlantic City. It doesn't - the inclusion of the termination provision doesn't limit or doesn't require the regulators to act prematurely. If it did why would sophisticated powerhouse lawyers permit - representing the plaintiffs permit that provision to be in the agreement? Their argument is that for some - on some basis that that provision is inappropriate, unlawful, illegal, immoral, and not
really very good. Well, why put it in if you didn't want that provision in there? They negotiated for that provision, for it, and they did so because both sides wanted to allocate the risk. It gave the plaintiff and defendant the walk-away right, excuse me, if they wanted it. It gave them time to get approval, and it gave us - importantly, when you're balancing things, Judge, it gave us an opportunity if it doesn't work, if it doesn't work out to get another player involved - excuse me, shouldn't use the word player - another entity involved in our business. So if, if you accept the argument that's been made by the plaintiffs that the termination provision couldn't be included and shouldn't be included, it would suggest that you could never terminate one of these agreements no matter what happened.

THE COURT: Which is the point that you make at page 17 of your brief. MR. CURTIN: Yes, sir. So I'm getting there.

I'm asking you please on my clients' behalf, let's try to look at the balance of the equities here. You don't have a contract with an ambiguity in it. You don't have a breach. There are no surprises here.

There's no unfair conduct. There's no, no issue that suggests that the relief that they've requested is in fact warranted. These were, again, sophisticated folks, as were we, and negotiated a contract that they could live with, and now they don't like the contract they've negotiated and they've asked you to rewrite it and to revise it.

Now I read a certification earlier about why. Why is this important to us currently? You know from that certification and from the, from the earlier argument that we need to take steps to protect our employees, our vendors, our contracts during this period of time in the summer. We can't wait until August. We can't wait to find out when and if there is approval. We can't do that. We, the board has fiduciary responsibilities to protect its shareholders, protect business, the business interests, and we have a responsibility as well to protect the community interest here. On-line gaming is coming. Everybody knows it's coming. We need to be geared up and get ready to go for that on-line gaming. We're at a standstill, as you've been told, and we need to move on if we're unable to - if we're not able to move forward from this day and - because we will never get our on-line gaming planning
completed. There is an uncertainty. There's an uncertainty in the community. There's an uncertainty with our employees. There's an uncertainty with our vendors. There's an uncertainty with our landlords as to whether or not we - they should continue in business with us.

If you do what you're being asked to do, Your Honor, by the plaintiffs in this case your ruling will be unique. To our knowledge there is no precedent for asking for what you've been asked here. There is a - You are dealing with a principle here that this is a - there are settled contract rights. These contract rights are enforceable. We're seeking to enforce the contract that we entered into, not and not enforce a contract that we didn't enter into and we're now being asked to by asking you to revise the provisions of the agreement to eliminate critical provisions that were bargained for and significant to us.

Thank you for permitting me to address the issues on the TRO, and obviously my ask here is that you dissolve the temporary restraining order which you entered and not enter an injunction on a going-forward basis and permit us to do what we contracted to do and what we're expected to do as good citizens of this
community.
THE COURT: I have many questions of both sides. I don't know whether you would have me pose them to you or to -

MR. CURTIN: I think if you pose them, Judge, we're -

THE COURT: - or to the bank of attorneys seated at the defense table.

First question. Do you take the position that this contract is clear and unambiguous?

MR. MUNDIYA: Yes, Your Honor, we do. We take that position. We think it's clear and unambiguous with respect to the termination provisions.

THE COURT: And the math is straightforward and undeniable?

MR. MUNDIYA: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Executed December 21.
MR. MUNDIYA: That's right.
THE COURT: The day after the Senate passes iGaming.

MR. MUNDIYA: That's right.
THE COURT: Requires the plaintiff to file with DGE within three days.

MR. MUNDIYA: Within three business days I
thought it was, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I stand corrected.
MR. MUNDIYA: Right, yes.
THE COURT: Three business days.
MR. MUNDIYA: Yes.
THE COURT: But the filing actually occurs within three days, on -

MR. MUNDIYA: Right.
THE COURT: - the 24 th.
MR. MUNDIYA: That's correct, I understand. Yes.

THE COURT: The 120th day subsequent to December 24 is?

MR. MUNDIYA: It's close enough to -
THE COURT: It's April 23rd.
MR. MUNDIYA: Right. Right.
THE COURT: And three days later, which is the three-day closing date calculus, is April 26th?

MR. MUNDIYA: Well, the three days is three business days. But - I don't have a calendar. But you're right, Your Honor. It is three days from April 23rd. That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: April 23rd was Tuesday.
MR. MUNDIYA: Right. So -
THE COURT: The 26th was Friday.

MR. MUNDIYA: That's right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MUNDIYA: So April 26th is three days thereafter.

THE COURT: So in terms of drafting that contract, if those dates were the dates intentionally negotiated there is virtually no room for plaintiff to secure an ICA absent DGE deeming the filing, the first filing complete on Christmas Eve.

MR. MUNDIYA: Well, you know, that was the, that was the date that was negotiated by both sides. That was a date that was negotiated -

THE COURT: No. I understand.

MR. MUNDIYA: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm accepting your argument that these are the negotiated dates.

MR. MUNDIYA: That's right.
THE COURT: I'm just -
MR. MUNDIYA: Yes.

THE COURT: - filling the math in between the dates.

MR. MUNDIYA: That's right.

THE COURT: This was an agreement, if you're correct, that the parties negotiated allowing zero room for $D G E$ taking anything more than the date of
filing, if they chose. They could have accelerated the 90-day turnaround if they wanted.

MR. MUNDIYA: They could, and - but there is precedent, Your Honor, for ICA approval being done in less than that time, and the parties knew that. They knew it, and we knew it, and we came to a determination that April 26 was the date that would allow them time to get their approval, and if they didn't get that approval would give us enough time to go out and find somebody else to be in a position to give on-line - provide on-line gaming in November.

THE COURT: I understand the argument. And
then $I$ read section 5.5 of the agreement, and $I$
believe I cited this when we spoke on the 14th.
MR. POSITAN: 5.5(b), I believe it is, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: It is. And it states in pertinent part, and I'll quote, (reading:)
"Not withstanding any determination from the Division that an application is incomplete or a failure by the Division to deem an application complete, any application referenced herein, including the application for an ICA determination, will be considered complete for purposes of compliance with this agreement even
though there may be supplemental or revised information and filings including but not limited to," and then it goes on. (Reading:)
"... unless, after requested, the buyer fails to make the additional or revised filings within the time frame required by statute or applicable regulation otherwise imposed by $N J$ CCC and/or NJ DGE."

That section of $5.5(b)$ suggests to me that the prospect of DGE deeming an initial filing incomplete was well within the contemplations of the party, and if that's the case how consistent is that contemplation with the tightest conceivable time line between filing and outside date absent report by DGE prior to the 90 -day deadline or relaxation either through a negotiated modification or waiver of the outside date? And I ask that question because it's my sense that's the plaintiff's point.

MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, if I may -
THE COURT: And if that's wrong I want to hear it.

MR. BROOKS: No. I think you're right. I think you're right, Your Honor. I want to acknowledge that. If you look at just the plain time frames that
are applicable -
MR. POSITAN: This is where I have a problem with Mr. Brooks. He said he wasn't going to speak before.

THE COURT: Well, I note the objection. I'm going to overrule the objection. I'm going to allow him to speak. Again, this is defendant's first opportunity to be in this court physically and present their, their position.

MR. BROOKS: I would -
THE COURT: So I'm inclined to be somewhat less formal than otherwise might be the case. Go ahead.

MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, thank you. The outside time frames, if you're looking at strictly the outside time frames then the time - then it is a very tight time frame as you described. The application, initial application on the 24th, and then about a 120day block of time for a ruling by the Division. But the statute provides that the Commission - the Division can report sooner. They can report sooner than a full 90 days after they deem an application complete.

THE COURT: Mmhmm.
MR. BROOKS: In fact, in practice, in
practice there has never been an ICA that I'm aware of where they ruled the full 90 days after they deem an application complete. Typically there's a back-andforth. There's a point in time when they deem an application complete and, per the rule, if they deem the application - if their report issues sooner, they can issue a report sooner. They're allowed, per the rule, to issue a report sooner, and as soon as they issue the report the Commission can conduct a hearing. So the - Yes, the time frame in the contract, if you look at just the outside possible dates if they took the full time and that 24 th was initial - you know, was initially a filing that would be complete, yes, it would fit in that time frame. But that's not what the parties were contemplating. They, the parties were not contemplating that and, in fact, the law provides that there could be a much sooner date. The law itself -

THE COURT: Right.
MR. BROOKS: - provides that the Division can issue a report. It doesn't need the full 90 days. THE COURT: Right.

MR. BROOKS: It doesn't even have to deem the application complete to issue its report, and after the report is issued the Commission can conduct
a hearing, which, as we pointed out in a lot of the submissions we made to the Court, has been the practice.

The intent of section $5.5(\mathrm{~b})$ was not, it wasn't contemplated that there would be an elongated ICA determination process. The intent of 5.5(b) was to address the situation dealing with when the plaintiff had an obligation to complete its application. The contract says you have three business days basically to complete your application to file a completed application, recognizing that often the Division will want more information and that that was a possibility. It also provided that if the Division did request more information it wouldn't be a breach of the contract - a breach of the requirement to file a completed application. That's what $5.5(\mathrm{~b})$ was meant to intend - to address rather. It wasn't meant to be a situation, Your Honor, where the parties were contemplating some elongated ICA determination process. Just as you noted by the dates, they weren't. They were contemplating at that time an ICA process that would not be that long, that would be done in a fairly prompt time frame.

THE COURT: Then my next question becomes who would reasonably anticipate even a 90-day report
by DGE given the history of some of the principals of the plaintiff entities, depending upon whose brief $I$ read and find the more credible, as to which everyone knew something.

MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, can I - if I could answer? Counsel - counsel for the plaintiffs, Your Honor. Counsel for the plaintiffs. They didn't - It wasn't like we were surprising them. Counsel for the plaintiffs, who are experienced gaming attorneys, experienced large law firms with very sophisticated attorneys, agreed to that date, agreed to that outside date. They were the ones handling the process. They are the ones that made a determination that that was an acceptable outside date. So the answer to that is, Your Honor, they did, counsel for the plaintiffs. MR. POSITAN: Now we're testifying, Your Honor.

MR. BROOKS: No, we're not, Your Honor. That's what the contract says. THE COURT: Well, to a degree we are. MR. MUNDIYA: It's THE COURT: Yes, sir?

MR. MUNDIYA: Your Honor, it's simply a matter of risk allocation. Experienced counsel on one side, experienced counsel on another side. They took
the risk, given all of their history, that they could get it done; and we agreed to that date because if they couldn't get it done we would have several months to go out and find somebody who could get it done. They couldn't get it done, and now they want to rewrite the contract. That's our position, Judge. THE COURT: I understand that position. There is reference, counsel, in plaintiffs' complaint to - Well, section 5.7, further assurances. I'm about to hear, I gather, that the language of 5.7 contemplates, if not its black-letter language but if it - in its spirit, a degree of cooperation for lack of a better term. Is that an incorrect reading of 5.7?

MR. MUNDIYA: Your Honor, section THE COURT: Particularly given plaintiffs' argument that they make with regard to the March 26, 2013 letter by Matejevich in which he pledges, "best efforts as promptly as practicable." Does that section correlate to that quoted section of that letter or email?

MR. MUNDIYA: Section 5.7 is - as it says, is, (reading:)
"Subject to the terms and conditions hereof each of the parties hereto agree to use reasonable
best efforts to take or cause to be taken all appropriate action and to do or cause to be done all things reasonably necessary, proper, and advisable under applicable laws."

That was the obligation of both sides, and all the March 26 th letter was doing was suggesting that. But the important thing, Your Honor, is - is the lead-in to that, "Subject to the terms and conditions herein." So there's nothing in 5.7(a) that would suggest that the termination provision is not applicable or that the outside date is not applicable. The outside date was fixed. It was clear. And so regardless of what the obligation was in 5.7(a), as soon as April 26 th came and went that event triggered an obligation - or a right rather under 7.1(b). So all 5.7(a) does is simply oblige the parties to negotiate - to do all things necessary and reasonable up and through April 26th. But once that date came and went, Your Honor, all bets were off.

THE COURT: You argue in your brief at pages 4 through 5 that post filing "significant information emerged publicly." And I gather that's a reference to the March 4, 2013 AGA "unprecedented objection." While it's interesting reading, do you take the position that that filing constitutes any basis for
any action or inaction, decision or indecision undertaken by the defendants here?

MR. MUNDIYA: No, Your Honor. It was just part of the mix. March came along. We got that information. It caused concern. March 26 th came along, and we had a conversation with the DGE. It's in the record. That caused concern. April 1 came along, and we asked for information which they refused to provide unless we signed an NDA. That caused concern. When we got the information without disclosing anything in the information, that caused concern. It was a continued development of events, which by the time we got to the end, caused us real concern about their prospects of licensing. So it was really a gradual process up until and through, through April 26th.

THE COURT: I expect to hear soon that upon your client being advised - I believe on April 11 that the filing, the application for the ICA had been deemed complete as of April 10, that the new outside date, at least in terms of the 120-day - 90-day reporting by DGE and 30 -day decision by the Casino Control Commission, would have brought you to August 9th and that the interceding marginal delay of three months was a relatively minor consideration.

Before you hear that from Mr. Positan, as long as you're on your feet what's your response to that?

MR. MUNDIYA: The response is in Mr. Matejevich's affidavit. If we cannot between the time - between today and August 10 th get out ahead and get this iGaming show on the road there's going to be untold harm to the defendants. In order to have iGaming ready in November we have to get a partner who, unlike them, has a shot at getting licensed. We need to get the software ready for on-line gaming, and that's technical and it takes a lot of time. We need to do the marketing for on-line gaming. So the months between now and August are, in some ways, the most critical, and when we have potential partners in there it's important to have the summer season be with us. You don't sell your house in the middle of winter. You sell your house when the flowers are blooming and the sun is shining. It's very, very important for us to be able to move on, to terminate this disagreement, be done, and get somebody who can help us be in line for on-line gaming in November; and that's not going to start in August because if we start in August, Your Honor, it's way too late, way too late. We have to start today.

THE COURT: Page 5 of your brief. Top of
the page, first full sentence, "The delays plaintiffs have encountered in the regulatory process were inevitable." Were they?

MR. MUNDIYA: There were some things we thought might be inevitable given the history, but they assured us - as you see in the certifications, they assured us that they could get it done. There was, there was a lot of negotiation on this provision. We thought that there would be, there would be delays. They told us we're done - we think we can get it done. In fact, we were hearing that from Mr. Isai Scheinberg calling in from wherever. He had a - he says he has a 90 percent chance of getting approval.

Your Honor, at this point we shouldn't have to take the risk. That's the point. Whether we thought it was inevitable or not inevitable, the point is that we are now here on May 17th and they don't have it, and the clock is running.

THE COURT: Given the tight time line on the agreement, the recent history by some principals affiliated with plaintiffs and some degree of familiarity with that history, I'm about to hear, I gather, that the structure of this contract, not just as relates to the time line, but the advance payment against operating loss up to the 11 million, which was
reached by February 1, constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy of non-compliance with the ICA. Do you follow me?

MR. MUNDIYA: Not really, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That the deal was structured to get their money, apply it against operating losses under the prospect of credits against the purchase price all within a time frame that, given the history of some of those principals with plaintiffs, was unrealistic.

MR. MUNDIYA: Okay.
THE COURT: Your response would be they're big boys and girls, -

MR. MUNDIYA: Risk allocation.
THE COURT: - sophisticated counsel, MR. MUNDIYA: It's more than that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: - buy a casino for 15 million although there's the two million in conditional payments to your two principals. There's the 32 million to reconstitute the unfunded pension obligations, the four million dollar - Well, that's part of the 15. Ultimately, had this agreement been fully completed or should it at some point, the purchase price really is more than 15 million dollars.

MR. MUNDIYA: You know, the purchase price is, is what it is in the contract. The important point for this Court, I think, is not only are they big boys and girls, the fact is that there is a provision in this agreement that says that all of the advances that they provide which went to operation, operating costs, that if this agreement is terminated those payments, those - that money shall not be refunded, and the reason for that is that in December we wanted this transaction to be as economically neutral as possible. We did not want to be in a worse position in April than we were in, in December. So we and they agreed that they would fund the casino that went not to the, not to the sellers but to the operations, to pay payroll, to pay expenses, and that come April, if there was no, no agreement, that that money, expressly in section 7.2(c), would stay with the company. That was the deal, Your Honor. And if we terminated pursuant to the lack of an outside date - or closing by the outside date, they agreed that they would pay a termination payment. Plain and simple.

Your Honor, on the contract Your Honor had two, two questions on the - at the beginning. Could I - May I address those?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MUNDIYA: The typographical error, I
think is -
THE COURT: Does there appear to be a phrase or a clause missing in that paragraph?

MR. MUNDIYA: Oh, on that one? Yes. I think the phrase is "unless subsequently approved" or words along those lines. I mean I'd have to go back and -

THE COURT: Would that be rather significant in this case?

MR. MUNDIYA: Well, Your Honor, we have to I have to sit with my corporate counsel. Maybe we can go through this at a break or something because I need to figure out exactly what it is, but we're - we're still working with that.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. MUNDIYA: But it may be words, may be something along those lines, but we just need to sit down and go through that. And in terms of 6.3 -

THE COURT: Well, if that's the missing phrase -

MR. MUNDIYA: Yeah. Well, it's not, it's not sig - Maybe we'll take a break and we'll try to figure out what that's supposed to say. But in terms
of 7. - or 6.3, I think it was 6.3(c) was missing. 6.3 - there's no, there should be no, no (c). So that, I think, is the, the typo. But we will, we'll get back to you on 7.1(c), Your Honor.

THE COURT: For now that's all I have. For now.

MR. MUNDIYA: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything else from the defense?
MR. CURTIN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Positan, would counsel prefer maybe a ten-minute break before we continue?

MR. CURTIN: We'll give you - maybe we'll get a response on that, Judge.

THE COURT: We've been under way a little bit over an hour, and it is mid-afternoon. Let's, let's stand in recess for ten minutes.

COURT ATTENDANT: All rise.
(Off the record at 2:33:08. Back on the record
at 2:44:25 as follows:)
THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. Again,
please be seated and make yourselves comfortable.
MR. BROOKS: We have - Are we good?
THE COURT: We're on the record?
THE CLERK: We're on the record.
THE COURT: Good. Okay.

MR. CURTIN: We have an answer to your question, Judge.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, if I may, there is no missing language in 7.1(c). The provision that you're looking at, that clause, "its application for gaming approval" is meant to modify withdrawals above or meant to relate to withdrawals above, and it deals with -

THE COURT: Say, say that again. I'm there now.

MR. BROOKS: "Its application for gaming approval," the clause that you were focusing on, Your Honor, you thought there was language missing after that. There's no language missing, Your Honor. That clause relates to the withdrawals above it. What was contemplated there, Your Honor, is that after a termination they may - we don't know what they're going to do with their application. They had a right to withdraw it, continue with it, and that's really what it addresses. But the clause itself, there's no missing language. That clause relates to withdrawals. So if you took out "unless subsequent to the termination of the agreement pursuant to section 7.1," it would simply say "or if buyer withdraws its
application for gaming approval."
THE COURT: I follow your interpretation. I'll share with you that I probably read and re-read that provision more times than I want to share. I didn't see that.

MR. BROOKS: But that's what it was intended to be, Your Honor.

MR. CURTIN: Judge, you were nice enough to ask me if $I$ had anything else. I do have one more thing. We have a demonstrative put together by us. I gave Mr. Positan a copy of it in advance of the argument today. It's on the board, and I have a handup copy that addresses one of the questions. During our break we thought it wise in response to the Court's question when you asked about how long things took, we've compiled public information the length of time to the granting of the ICA from the execution date, and we have a demonstrative that we could use to talk to you about that subject if you would like to see it.

THE COURT: Mr. Positan, any -
MR. CURTIN: I've reversed it because I didn't want to have it - you look at it -

THE COURT: Does it, does it visualize my math?

MR. CURTIN: It visualizes your math.
MR. POSITAN: Well, Your Honor, I didn't get it in advance. It was as I walked through the door there actually.

MR. CURTIN: It was after he sat down.
MR. POSITAN: Yeah. After we sat down. So I haven't even had a chance to look at it. We don't need demonstrative evidence.

First of all, and I - We were told there are 25 contracts. Nobody filed a certification. Nobody gave them to us. We can't even look at them. We just got their little chart. I don't know if it's accurate or not. I don't even, I can't even compare their demonstrative evidence to what would be the evidence except it's not in evidence. So we don't have them. I don't know what they're talking about. What we're able to glean from their chart, it has a glaring bunch of inconsistencies. Like Colony Capital themselves, which closed and got their license outside, after the outside closing date. I don't know if that one's on the chart or not, but that's what they did. They did exactly what they said we shouldn't do in this case. But that's, you know, how much testimony are we going to have from the sophisticated bunch of lawyers who have all the mistakes in their contract that took them
five to figure out whether it should have been in there or not? That's what happens, I guess, when you have all these sophisticated lawyers from all over the place doing contracts.

THE COURT: Are you testifying now?
MR. POSITAN: Well, I figure if everybody else can I might as well.

MR. CURTIN: Well, I haven't had my, I haven't had my turn yet though.

MR. POSITAN: I'm just one of these country lawyers from up in Roseland, New Jersey, Your Honor. I'm not one of these 700 firm guys, you know?

THE COURT: Mr. Curtin, go ahead.
MR. CURTIN: Neither am I.
MR. POSITAN: We're just a rose among
thorns, I guess, Tom.
THE COURT: Put it this way. To the extent that you've brought visual aids, while I appreciate it, I don't know that I need it. I've read - I hope if nothing else, I hope it's apparent that I've read your sulbmissions.

MR. CURTIN: Very much so, Judge.
THE COURT: And I'm familiar. I'm satisfied with your arguments. Mr. - Go ahead. MR. CURTIN: The reason that - what prompted
it, Judge, I mean we brought it obviously to use as part of the presentation, but what prompted it was the Court seemed to be focused on dates and whether these were tight time frames or not such tight time frames, and we could - these are illustrative of the fact that the times are all over the map.

THE COURT: Well, but -

MR. CURTIN: And if the Court will draw that conclusion from our argument, then we need not show you the billboards.

MR. POSITAN: And here's another problem, Your Honor. We don't know what the terms of those contracts were. That's the real problem.

THE COURT: But here's what I'm satisfied in a general sense, and perhaps these are suppositions. That each contract to purchase a casino interest is unique. It stands on its own. The parties are different, their resources are different, their priorities are different, and as a result the time period within which DGE deems itself comfortable to submit its final report to the Commission, they probably vary. They probably run within a range. There may be a so-called beaten path of an average, but I don't know that that helps me from a standpoint of this return on the order to show cause. I am
satisfied that I have a handle on the outside dates, 90 plus 30 ; that this agreement from the date of the filing ran 120 plus 3 to the 26 th.

MR. POSITAN: Actually you have to correct that as well, Your Honor, because it didn't take into account the Christmas holiday. Mr. Eisenstein can give you the actual count on that.

THE COURT: Well, if I'm within a day. I'm a lawyer, not a mathematician. If I'm within a day I'm happy. I'm satisfied I have the tight time line. And that raises many questions. We're discussing those questions or counsel are offering your sense of the appropriate answer, and I'm about to hear from Mr. Positan. So go ahead.

MR. POSITAN: Your Honor, the time line actually runs from December 27 th and it goes past the date. Right?

MR. EISENSTEIN: That's correct, Your Honor. We in good faith filed our license application immediately -

THE COURT: On the 24 th.
MR. EISENSTEIN: - on the 24 th, but it was the third business day after that we were obligated to. The 21st was a Friday, 21st of December, and we had the Christmas holiday on the 25th. So our
obligation was the 27 th, and if you carried that out it brings the third business day after the 120-day period -

THE COURT: Which was the outside date.
MR. EISENSTEIN: - beyond the outside date.
MR. POSITAN: That goes to the question of the validity of the contract obviously.

THE COURT: The floor is yours.
MR. POSITAN: Your Honor, I heard the words from my good friend Tom Curtin, who said this is all about the balancing of the equities; and I heard his counsel from New York, from Wilkie Farr say, you know, an impassioned plea about how summer is upon us and this is the time, because otherwise winter is coming. I don't know if you watch the game like me, winter is coming. Well, winter came last December. And does everybody remember what was going on last December at that casino? They were on the verge of filing bankruptcy, 1,800 jobs lost, and the only thing that stopped that was my client. My client agreed to that deal. It infused weekly pay. All those people, that's how those people kept working. And through the winter when the times were bad, through Hurricane Sandy and the recovery, would that hotel have even opened up again after Hurricane Sandy without my
client? You want to talk about equities? So they lay out $\$ 11,000,000$. $\$ 750,000$ a week. There's a clause in there that we furnished in our brief.

THE COURT: By February 1.
MR. POSITAN: Pardon me?
THE COURT: By February 1.
MR. POSITAN: By February 1. But there's a clause right after that that says if further funds are needed and they're going to go into bankruptcy they give us notice first, and we pony up as an advance. They didn't have to do that, did they? That's because their COO is releasing things saying, oh, now we're, now we're okay. This is the same COO who, on March 13th, Mr. Frawley - you know, we read all about this, this smear campaign on my, on my client - who talks about the AGA, and it says - and he - this is on March 13th.

MR. CURTIN: What is this?
MR. POSITAN: This is Mr. Frawley's transcription from his interview, which was attached to the papers and transcribed by Schulman Wiegmann Court Reporters, and he talks about he'd like to see it happen as soon as possible. (Reading:)
"Q. There have been those who say that The Atlantic Club would be in very serious
trouble, that its future would be imperiled were it not for internet gaming, were it not for the possibility as well of sports betting being actually implemented. Is that true?
A. Yes. It is certainly a possibility. Our possibility and our future has been brightened by the foresight of the lawmakers in New Jersey. Internet gaming has been a great help to us, and it helped bring us together with PokerStars.
Q. What would that mean to your bottom line?
A. Right now we are not a profitable casino. With PokerStars and with internet gaming and the capital investment they're prepared to make in the property we expect to be more than profitable.
Q. How much is that capital investment that they expect to make?
A. Right now it's about 20 million the first year and will probably approach over 40 million over the next five years, and that only includes our property. I know there are plans to invest in other places in the state. We are also going to have to build a
data center on the property, which is a very significant capital investment.
Q. There are those who have said that there have been tremendous resistance from various elements within the gaming community and the gaming industry, and we've heard conversations and accusations lately that Caesar's is behind a good deal of that. Do you believe that to be the case?
A. I believe the AGA, which certainly Caesar's is a part of, probably has a little bit more of an agenda. PokerStars is the largest internet gaming company in the world. They're a great company. Their customers are absolutely loyal to them. I think it's an issue before anybody makes a judgment they should look at what ulterior motive could be behind it.
Q. The poll we referred to just before we did this interview, even though there's obviously a smaller and smaller number of New Jerseyans who are opposed to internet gaming, there are still more than that opposed that are in favor of it, and many of them say they're just worried about it being
too easy for people to either gamble when they shouldn't perhaps or for people to develop gambling problems. What do you say to that?
A. I think one of the things the governor addressed, and rightfully so, is the problem gaming issue. The other issue would be security. If you look at some of the security measures that I've been privy to I'm amazed at how they're able to keep under-aged gamers, people - there is an exclusion list, a sizeable - PokerStars is prepared to put a sizeable amount of funding into the problem gaming fund. I think there needs to be a little bit more education on it in a lot of ways before people make a snap judgment."

It talks then about - Oh, and it says, (reading:)
"Q. And last question for you, there's been much talk about trying to transform Atlantic City once again to turn it more into a family destination than a gambling destination. Do you believe that would be an advisable move?
A. I think that it needs to have a broader appeal beyond gaming. I think gaming will
be our core business. I think we're a little ways from making it the family destination that it should be, but we're making progress. I am very pleased with the things I'm hearing from the governor's office. I'm very pleased with the things I'm hearing from PokerStars. I think that if you look at more capital investment, the more the casinos are profitable the more capital investment they make, the more people are apt to come, the more we're able to build our properties up to where we want them to be.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Frawley."

So PokerStars is pretty good, Mr. Frawley's view on March 13th, wasn't it? And then they put all this stuff in about PokerStars. We've brought all their blogs in, like Mr. Brooks' blog on his firm's not his blog, his firm's blog talking about PokerStars and the problems that they're going to encounter. This in July of 2012, six months before. But PokerStars was okay then. And, and you look at some of the other things they've put out with the papers in this suit, and everything they say, you look at their blog and you get a different story. They clearly knew
about the legal problems that PokerStars have had. Everybody knew that going into there, and everybody knew it was going to be the province of the people who were charged to make that determination whether or not an ICA should issue, and that is what should happen here.

The State of New Jersey in addition to my client has put a lot of effort, funding, and absolutely proceeding to this day with this application despite all of this stuff that's before you and is put out in the paper. Who started the public relations? They did. The fact of the matter is the DGA (sic) is proceeding. There's a bunch of interviews still set up, as we set forth in our papers. It hasn't stopped. That licensing approval is proceeding. They will be finished with it in about less than two months.

We made this deal. This contract, the way it's stated and the way they're trying to say it now, they have one hand behind their back to say we're going to fail, but you give us the money. You keep us going through the dog days of winter, and then when the blossoms of spring come, hey, forget about it. We're done. Ha-ha, we cancel. You guys are a bunch of bad guys. We don't think you're ever going to get
a license. Well, guess what? That's what the DGA (sic) decides, the DGE, not them.

Sophisticated buyers? Yeah. We saved their butts. That's what sophisticated buyers are doing here. And what do we get? We're getting the end of the stick. So give us the 11 million. Oh, by the way, you - we terminate. Give us another four million. The equities? How about the pension funding? How about that 32 million dollars? All his employees are going to get that? How about the resources that the State of New Jersey has put into this to go through this license application? Daily basis five, six people. How come the State of New Jersey hasn't listened to, you know, the former judge here that, oh, forget about it? What's the point? They didn't do that. They're going on it today. That process goes on. Let them do their job.

A couple things happened in this case. We put up the investment. As you heard from their COO, we're going to put up another twenty-, forty million dollars to turn that property around, but now they just want to say, you know what, let's take that 15 million, and the heck with those guys. Ha-ha-ha. We're very sophisticated. They're - you know, they're bad guys anyway, even though we thought they were
great guys before. But now, you know what, how about if we put all this stuff out, and maybe we'll, we'll mess up the whole process. Maybe we'll convince the DGE that they really are bad guys. So we'll take the money, and you're good guys. Once you give them the money, well, now they're bad guys. And now let's make sure that we do everything we can to make this go down the tubes because we get to keep the money and now, hey, summer's here again. Time to make some money. That's what's going on here.

Bad faith. Really insidious terrible
conduct. This deal was structured to go through with that license approval. We don't get the approval, we lose. We get the approval, close. That's this deal. THE COURT: Where does the contract language say that?

MR. POSITAN: The contract, that can only be read in one way, Your Honor. Those two clauses have to be read together because, again, I don't know what those other 25 contracts say. And, once again, we have these so-called experts opining here. I don't know how much they got paid to opine, but we'll find that out someday, I guess. But the Superior Court, it is unique. It hasn't ruled on it. Nobody's ruled on this issue before. You know, it's kind of like a
house closing. Everybody's got the form contract. They say, "Okay, we're going to sign the contract. This is going to close on April 30th." "Oh, wait a minute, can't close on April 20th. The plumber couldn't get there to check wires," and we all know that sometimes the house contract doesn't close on the date in the original contract, does it? And you say, "Oh, okay. Let's close on another date." And then about five times later you say, "Okay. The contract's got to close by that date," and the house closes.

Well, you know, it's hard to apply that logic to all these sophisticated casino contracts because that's the way it's been going on in Atlantic City. But maybe if some time somebody said to everybody, "You know what, why don't you guys comply with the law? Why don't you comply with 5:1295.1(2) (a) because that really is a part of the contract by a matter of law?" You know, and this references in the agreement when you read 7.1(b), which permits the parties to terminate, quote, (reading:)
"If the transactions contemplated hereby shall not have been consummated on or prior to the outside date."

What's that mean? Same thing as the definition back
in 1.4(a). The transactions are all tied together here. The contemplation in order to comply with that statute is that it's the statutory date from the completion of that license, and we all know in this room that that's July 9th for the DGE and August 9th for the CCC.

THE COURT: Where in the contract is there language that precludes the closing date from occurring subsequent in time, or from maturing subsequent in time to the outside date?

MR. POSITAN: As a matter of law it's part of the, part of the same structure. When you, when it refers to transactions, the actual clause in this case I'm talking about referring to the transactions contemplated hereby. It doesn't say herein, hereby. THE COURT: I'm referring now to page 17 of the defendants' brief, and I believe I made the point in our teleconference on May 14th, but I'll quote from the defendants' brief. (Reading:)
"If the plaintiffs are correct, then the contract could never be terminated, and the parties forced to continue in a relationship forever depending on when the regulators deemed the application to be complete."

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If you're correct, that extension of that
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premise is accurate.
MR. POSITAN: If we didn't complete by

April 26th they had a right to cancel. Once we completed the statute goes in effect. We close per the statute. We have three days after that double level of regulatory approval is made. If we don't get approved we're done.

THE COURT: Let me ask this, and I hope I'm not -

MR. POSITAN: They, they get the money.

THE COURT: And I hope I'm not -

MR. POSITAN: That was the risk we took.

THE COURT: Let me ask this question, and I hope I'm not turning any, any counsel at the table into potential fact witnesses, and you're talking to a judge who is a former South Jersey, Cape May County real estate lawyer who used to stay up all night worrying about the results in termite certifications.

Who - and there may well be reasons with which I'm just not familiar, but who would undertake, not a 15-million-dollar transaction, the contingent to at 17, the 32 million to fund the pension fund. Now you're up close to 40 - 50 .

MR. POSITAN: 48 .

THE COURT: A 40-million-dollar transaction
in the most highly regulated industry in New Jersey, I gather, and box yourself in to these time constraints given what I'll characterize - and not to be disrespectful; I think I'm actually cleaning it up a little bit - the history of some of the principals affiliated with plaintiffs? Who, who would do that as a business person? What lawyer would allow a client to do that and go home and be able to sleep that night knowing that each weekly advance to cover operating losses is gone whether you ultimately close or not? I mean I absolutely follow your argument -

MR. POSITAN: My client is not stupid, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm - Well, -
MR. POSITAN: Nobody ever accused him of being that.

THE COURT: I'm not suggesting that. But that is part of the response.

MR. POSITAN: And the answer is no. You know why? Because it's convenience. It's an argument of convenience, it's an argument of greed, and it's an argument of disingenuous conduct because somebody at one point in time decided that last week of April that, you know what, I think we could read that this way and let's keep the money. Oh, we'll get another
buyer. Hey, the statute passed now, and then we'll go on a campaign to try to make it as bad as possible and make sure these guys don't get their license.

THE COURT: And you may be right, yet plaintiff didn't execute the agreement until the day after the state senate passed the bill out of the senate. So to that extent plaintiff MR. POSITAN: Governor vetoed it once before.

THE COURT: Well, businessmen are opportunists. Businessmen and women are opportunists. They all follow the money.

MR. POSITAN: Meet me tonight in Atlantic
City, right?
THE COURT: Not, not lost on the Court that this contract was executed after the months of negotiation, the term sheet, the amended term sheet, December 20 the legislation passes out of the senate. December 21 the agreement is signed. Tight time constraints. Buyers with, again, a history, and while I don't pretend to know all things with regard to the process, it's just my general knee-jerk reaction if $I$ were advising a client for the first time who was considering applying even for a casino license to be a waiter/waitress, anything, bartender, if they had an
expunged disorderly persons conviction my instinct would be, "You've got a problem. It's going to delay the process. Build it into the contract. Protect yourself, protect your investment."

This is far different from that on a far greater magnitude, and as I read and re-read all that's before me, it's fascinating reading I'll share with you. Unfortunately it's reality, and there's appeal to your argument. The difficulty that $I$ have is I then go back to the contract, and it may well be that the only explanation for why plaintiff agreed to these terms is that as attributed by the defendants.

MR. POSITAN: Then why 5.5(b)? Why the other provisions about -

THE COURT: Well, I've, I've -
MR. POSITAN: - cooperating?
THE COURT: I've - I've, I've -
MR. POSITAN: Because it was contemplated.
It was contemplated that there would be those problems. And why on March 26 th the letter from them saying we're with you, we're going to get this done? What changed between -

THE COURT: As, as -
MR. POSITAN: - March 26th and April 26th?
THE COURT: As, as promptly as practicable
and depending upon which dictionary you read -
MR. POSITAN: If that's not a waiver I don't know what is after you took all our money.

THE COURT: Depending upon which dictionary you read, Random House, Kennerman, Webster's College Dictionary defines practicable as "capable of being done or put into practice with available means." The thesaurus printed by my alma mater, Princeton University, "Practicable: capable of being done with means at hand and circumstances as they are."

Practicable. Could have real significant meaning.

MR. POSITAN: Like the legal theory of practicability for example. That's after all the money is taken. Everything is fine on March 26th, and everybody knew on March 26th that the application wasn't complete and there was no way that a closing could occur before April 26th. Everybody knew that. The application got completed on April 10th.

THE COURT: Here's my next question. Do you acknowledge that the disclosure or non-disclosure agreement - please turn the phone off - sought by your client as relates to the defendants on April 15th was not a contractual provision?

MR. POSITAN: It was part of cooperating in
terms of sharing information. A question came up. My client believed it was confidential. They asked for a confidentiality agreement. It was given.

THE COURT: Would you acknowledge that the execution of the confidentiality agreement on April 17 was not a specific affirmative obligation of the defendants in the contract?

MR. POSITAN: No. I think it's part of the cooperation clause that we've already been talking about.

THE COURT: Okay. Then let me ask this. If plaintiffs know by, by March 26 th, one month prior to the outside date, that DGE is of the position that it will likely take another 90 days for its report to get to the Commission, why wait until April 23rd to formally propose an extension of the outside date?

MR. POSITAN: And ask for six million
dollars in ten days, right?
THE COURT: No, that was -
MR. POSITAN: That was in good faith.

THE COURT: No. That came later.

MR. POSITAN: Okay.

THE COURT: But why wait - I mean a month almost passes. From March 26th, DGE needs another 90, to April 23rd, at which point plaintiffs communicate a
proposed formal extension of the outside date. If you know it's coming that far in advance why continue to address the fringe issues as opposed to the giant in the room, the most important term in that contract?

MR. POSITAN: At any time point in time after December 28 th everybody knew that that couldn't be done by April 26 th.

THE COURT: Well, if that's the case -
MR. POSITAN: So everything that happened in the interim -

THE COURT: If, if that -
MR. POSITAN: - was done with eyes open.
Take the money, don't say a word, and then on
April 23rd you change your mind for the first time?
THE COURT: Well, it - 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful thing, and $I$ confess to engaging in it at the moment. But if you knew it December 28 th, or if $I$ knew it December 28th, I'm getting something in writing before $I$ start writing checks for 11 million dollars by February 1 knowing that it's not, it's not coming back to me.

MR. POSITAN: Because we thought we had a deal. And on the other side I think their conduct shows you what they thought, too.

THE COURT: But in, but in a contract that
is -
MR. POSITAN: And here saying today that we thought it was, it was something different when it was negotiated. But that, what did they do?

THE COURT: But in a con -
MR. POSITAN: That's called estoppel.
THE COURT: But in a contract that is time of the essence and which can be either modified or waived only in a writing signed by both sides. This contract is, $I$ believe, 70-some pages, relatively lengthy, but its clarity is apparent, the clarity of its terms, and I'm just - I'm trying to correspond your equitable arguments, they enjoy such appeal with, with the language in the contract.

MR. POSITAN: Well, mine match up with the statute. That's what hap - that's what's supposed to happen in these applications. Otherwise, why would we go through that process? Why would the State of New Jersey DGE go through that process if somebody was going to say, "Oh, sorry. You're wasting your time. Ha-ha. We're - you know, we're done." Why would we put the State through that process?

THE COURT: Well, I gather the stat -
MR. POSITAN: That's why the statutes are there, -

THE COURT: But I -
MR. POSITAN: - is to stop that from
happening.
THE COURT: But I gather the statutes were adopted in their present form because the Legislature wanted to make sure that it - or that the regulatory agencies never lost control of the process of oversight of the purchase and sale of casino interests, is my sense, because by that statute they, they - they run that show.

MR. POSITAN: Well, if you rule their way that's exactly what happens, they lost control, because they're out there still trying to do what's supposed to happen in this deal. Why would they do that if they thought this deal was over?

THE COURT: Well, that's, that's one of my questions, but I'm deliberately not asking that question because what may or may not be happening administratively is really not binding upon this court. My sense is that individuals involved in that process probably have some passing interest at least in terms of this matter -

MR. POSITAN: Well, if you want to talk about the public interest, how about we get all the funding that comes from the resource actually going
through here? How about, how about my client actually gets approved and is up and running in November? As they said, maybe we're the only one who can do that. And how about the financial effect on the employees of that casino, getting their pensions funded for 32 million dollars? And how about the revenue it's going to bring to the state budget? So is there a public interest involved here? Absolutely. And my client is in position to make that happen. Nobody else is. And we were there in the dog days of winter saving all this. If we thought that that thing was going to get pulled out for us on April 26th, nah, no way. There's a statute that says process happens, then closing. You've got to read those two things together, with all due respect, with all the cooperation clauses with their conduct. Accepting the money. March 26th, we're with you, let's get this done. Right up until April 23rd and then all of a sudden, oops, sorry guys. Hey, we got the money. We're done.

THE COURT: But if that's the correct construction then why is the contract silent as to it? It's the most important term in that contract. How can the contract be silent if you're correct.

MR. POSITAN: Statute applies.
THE COURT: Statute's not even -

MR. POSITAN: We thought, we thought we had a deal -

THE COURT: Statute's not even cited in that.

MR. POSITAN: - that - If we didn't get, the risk was if we don't get licensed we lose the money. So if we're the bad guys that they say we are, then the DGE will decide that we're not given them a license, and we lose -

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. POSITAN: - and you keep the money.

That was the deal. On the other side, if we get approval then we're supposed to get the deal and pay our 48 million dollars, save the pension fund. Put another 40 million dollars into it, like their COO says, and then you've got a nice operating piece of property. You want to improve Atlantic City? There it is. But no, no, somebody decides on April 26th, April 27 th, nah, you know what? Statute passed now. We'll throw these guys under the bus. We'll keep the money. We'll get another buyer. We'll make more money. Greed. That's what this is all about. THE COURT: Do defendants care to be heard? MR. CURTIN: Yes. Response, please, Judge. THE COURT: By the way, counsel, everybody
gets two rounds.

MR. MUNDIYA: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. This will be very, very brief.

This was a termination clause that was mutual. Not just us. They could have terminated as well. So I think Your Honor should keep that in mind as you -

THE COURT: But you have their 11 million dollars, in fairness.

MR. MUNDIYA: Yes, we do. Something that they agreed to do.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. MUNDIYA: Right. The next -

THE COURT: You're probably less, you're probably less inclined to walk away from a deal near the end if you're out eleven of the 15 million.

MR. MUNDIYA: Understood.

THE COURT: And the swing is walking away with nothing if you terminate or having an Atlantic City casino. That's a huge swing.

MR. MUNDIYA: It is a huge swing. But, again, they came in with their eyes open. The other thing that they could have done, and you see this in other agreements, is they could have negotiated a right to an extension. That happens all the time,
that if - if they had negotiated for that right in December, then we wouldn't be standing here. But they didn't do that. And there are other agreements in which their regulatory counsel has negotiated extension rights. So they know how to negotiate for an extension, and they didn't do it. That, Your Honor, we think speaks volumes about the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract.

The next thing Mr. - my adversary says is you've got to tie the two things together. New Jersey law is clear that every provision of a contract has to be given a meaning, and contracts should be harmonized to give every clause a meaning. If he's right, you are writing out the word outside date out of the contract, you're writing out section $7.1(b)$. It has no meaning if he's right. Why would we put it in? What does it mean? It's there throughout this contract. Section 5.5(c), a provision he didn't speak about, talks about having to get to a closing but no later than the outside date. In the same provision they talk about a closing and an outside date. So his argument is completely inconsistent with the plain unambiguous language of this contract, and every provision has to be given meaning. And if you accept that principle of New Jersey law, we win.

MR. POSITAN: In pari materia.
MR. MUNDIYA: I don't know what that means. THE COURT: Equal footing.

MR. POSITAN: I think ...
THE COURT: Mr. Positan, anything further?
Anything further, sir?
MR. POSITAN: Your Honor, we rely upon our papers, and we thought your initial decision in this matter was right on line, and you do have to read it in pari materia, this contract, despite some of its shortcomings and missing - or misnumbered things. We think it was clear. We think the parties' intentions were very clear from the beginning, and we think they should be given their full intent, which, as we all know, we're not going on a long time frame here. We have a statutory period which is ongoing as we sit here today, which will be completed in about six weeks, seven weeks, and obviously there's been a lot of resources devoted to this and we just want the benefit of what we thought we negotiated. The equities I believe are very clear.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.
MR. CURTIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm going to thank counsel for your submissions. I also want to acknowledge and
thank you for your civility toward one another. It's appreciated.

I noted in reading your pleadings, specifically the verified complaint and defendants' responsive brief in support of this application to vacate restraints, that the, the time line, the dates do not appear to be factually contested; but in that regard a brief recital of the time line is appropriate before I enter my findings.

And the Court learns from reading all of the submissions that in or about September of 2012 a defendant entity, RIH Management, became interested in the prospect apparently of on-line gaming presented at The Atlantic Club in Atlantic City, and apparently representatives of RIH agreed and RIH Management as well to retain a lobby hired for the purpose of seeking passage of legislation in New Jersey that would permit on-line gaming, that per paragraph 2 of the Matejevich certification. And at some point thereafter, meaning thereafter in September of 2012, RIH Management became aware that PokerStars was an entity which operated international on-line poker rooms and tournaments, was interested in entering the Atlantic City gaming market, and there occurred at some point in October of 2012 apparently an initial
discussion between Mr. Matejevich and one Ira (sic) Scheinberg, who is certainly referenced in the AGA brief and in some of the other submissions as well, apparently Mr. Scheinberg, a founder of PokerStars or various interests affiliated with it; and in October of 2012 Mr. Scheinberg expressed an interest in a potential acquisition of the entity that owned and operated The Atlantic Club - see the Matejevich certification, paragraph 3. At the time Matejevich was seemingly aware that PokerStars had some legal issue - and I'm referencing the language in the defense brief - with the United States government, although it is asserted by the defense that PokerStars affirmatively represented to Matejevich that it had paid a large settlement to the United States government that resolved many of the legal issues that PokerStars faced.

Matejevich claims, at least in his certification, paragraph 3, that he was not fully aware of the extent of criminal problems that Scheinberg and other senior officials at PokerStars allegedly faced. Matejevich claimed, for example, to not know that Scheinberg and another officer of PokerStars, one Paul Tate, were fugitives from the American courts. Now that's the defendants'
assertion. It's contested by the plaintiff. I don't need to adjudicate the status of Mr. Tate or Scheinberg for purposes of this proceeding.

What is clear is that on or about November 7 of 2012 and after more than a month of negotiations the sellers - by that I mean the entities owning The Atlantic Club - and an entity known as Rational Entertainment Ventures Limited, hereinafter Rational excuse me, I heard it pronounced - a company formed by PokerStars, executed a term sheet providing for the sale of 100 percent of the membership interests in RIH, the company that owns and operates The Atlantic Club, to Rational.

The term sheet called for Rational to pay cash advances to be used to fund operations while due diligence and negotiations toward a final purchase agreement continued. Under the term sheet were a purchase agreement to be executed advances were to be applied against the purchase price. Sellers were willing to attempt to complete a sale of the company to a PokerStars affiliate presumably because, at least in part, PokerStars represented, claims defense, that its legal problems were largely resolved and expressed a willingness not only to commit to cash advances to fund operating deficits, but also agreed to an
expeditious time table for consummating the transaction, parenthetically a most expeditious time table.

Importantly, claims the defendants, during negotiations of the term sheet and the membership purchase agreement both sides were represented by sophisticated and experienced corporate and regulatory counsel, that according to Matejevich certification, paragraph 7, and the Brooks certification, paragraphs 19 through 21.

The allocation of risk relating to the receipt of required regulatory approval was very much a subject of the negotiation. That per paragraph 6 of the Matejevich certification, but also per counsels' arguments here today on behalf of defendants.

As a result of the financial condition of The Atlantic Club at the time, which was not seemingly sound, and the impending onset of on-line gaming, the termination provision which set a date after which the agreement could be terminated by either party were the transaction to yet be incomplete was critical. Such a provision would allow the seller sufficient time to pursue other alternatives if PokerStars was unable to get licensed in a timely manner per the defense brief. The same pertains in this Court's view to that clause
as related to the plaintiff.

The term sheet was executed November 7 . Negotiations toward a definitive purchase agreement drug into December of 2012 and, as I've earlier discussed with counsel, the New Jersey Senate passed the pending bill to legalize on-line gaming on December 20, and on the very next day sellers executed the agreement with Rational; and section 1.4(a) of that agreement defines the closing date, and it has been noted and quoted by counsel and the court throughout this proceeding, but suffice it to say "not later than the third business day following satisfaction or waiver of all the conditions set forth in article 6, which contains a number of conditions, but the most significant of which is procurement, timely procurement of - and prior to the outside date of a valid and then effective ICA, Interim Casino Authorization, from the Casino Control Commission.

It is asserted that as part of the agreement and consistent with one of the sellers' primary objectives the parties agreed to that expeditious transaction, and the time line counsel and I have reviewed in detail - I'll just incorporate that discussion by reference - but it is difficult for this Court to imagine a time line from execution of the
agreement to the filing of the first submission three days thereafter to the expiration of the 120-day review period for the entire transaction to have been negotiated to occur more, more quickly. And the outside date, of course, was April 26 of 2013. The parties agreed that Rational would not be refunded advances it had made and would be required to pay a termination fee in the event the transaction was terminated for reasons other than a breach of the agreement by the sellers.

Furthermore, an entity related in some fashion to the plaintiffs, Oldford, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed the obligation, and section 7.2(c) of the agreement provided that, (reading:) "If the agreement is terminated for any reason pursuant to section 7.1 buyer shall pay the sellers representative for further distribution to the sellers within two business days of such termination an amount in cash equal to $\$ 4,000,000$, and the company shall be entitled to retain all advances paid by buyer to the company pursuant to this agreement and the binding term sheet as of such termination."

The agreement incorporated a provision providing each party the right to walk away if the
transaction took longer to complete than the mutually agreed upon date of April 26, the so-called outside date.

The agreement in a general sense memorialized the parties' agreement that Rational would assume all the licensing risk. It's argued here today, and the contract is fairly construed to that effect. Rational, plaintiffs, kept their part of the bargain through certainly May 1, 2013, by which date they had advanced $\$ 11,000,000$. That was the advance cap per the contract. And plaintiffs also negotiated the cooperation by defendants to allow plaintiffs to begin the construction of a new poker facility inside the casino, and Rational agreed to pre-fund all related costs and expenses. As of the date of the notice of termination there apparently was a balance of $\$ 94,927.91$. That, that has been paid as I understand the pleadings.

Rational did satisfy the three-day postexecution filing requirement as relates to the application for the ICA, and defendants claim through the Matejevich certification, paragraph 11, that it, they, Matejevich were made aware by DEG (sic) that Rational was not providing information to the DEG (sic) in a timely manner. That's a contested fact,
but that's a position indicated by the parties.
In any event, all seemed to concede that in March of 2013, specifically on March 4, the American Gaming Association undertook something which apparently had not earlier been undertaken and that is that it filed a brief with the DGE seeking to intervene in the application of Rational for the ICA, and a copy of that brief has been provided to the Court. I've read it. It is not dispositive to this particular application, and actually I'm not entirely certain that it's relevant and, if relevant, only to a minimal degree. Assuming for the moment everything asserted by AGA against Rational in that brief to be true, nonetheless the parties had an existing and valid and clearly written contract between the two of them, and their duties and rights were not adversely affected in this Court's view as a matter of law to any extent. Each continued to owe to the other good faith, due diligence, and fair dealing in their contractual relations.

It is somewhat acknowledged by defendants that the filing of the intervention petition nonetheless was unsettling. And then on March 26 th Matejevich claims to have received a phone call from representatives of DEG (sic) advising that Rational
still had not satisfied DEG's (sic) information request. See the Matejevich certification at paragraph 13. DGE also specifically stated apparently that after Rational's application was deemed complete it would need yet another 90 days to issue its expert - to issue its report on the application, and Matejevich conveyed sellers' concerns, defendants' concerns to Rational in a letter dated March 26, 2013 and during a call to a Mr. Templar, a representative of the plaintiffs. Matejevich advised Templar that it was Matejevich's impression that the DGE might not issue its report until July or August of 2013, not June as plaintiffs had earlier supposed.

There also occurred in the month of March other events per the pleadings, and they do not appear to be contested. March 26th the DGE again did contact plaintiff and requested the additional information in the form of documents and this, claims plaintiff, its first instance of information that suggested there might be additional delay. Matejevich in a letter to plaintiff, specifically Exhibit B I believe to plaintiffs' complaint, indicated that he and defendants remained "fully committed to comply, including cooperating with buyer and using their best efforts to obtain all applicable governmental
approvals as promptly as practicable." And he also indicates that the ICA application was "reasonably likely not to be timely satisfied."

On March 27, 2013 plaintiffs' attorney undertook a telephone conversation with defendants' counsel regarding new information needed within several days. On March 29 of 2013 Matejevich requested payment for past and future work on the poker room. On March 31 of 2013 Mr. Templar undertook a telephone conversation with one Richard Welch, a representative of Colony, a defendant affiliated entity, and sought assurances from Welch that nothing significant had changed. Defendants indicated at that point that they would independently approach DGE to separately inquire as to the status of the application.

On April 1 of 2013 another request from DGE for additional information was received, and the response deadline was indicated to be April 22 of 2013. The next day, April 2 of '13, the parties' attorneys spoke with one another in a conference call. In that call there was no indication of a claim of breach, no intention to - no indication of any intention to terminate, at least asserts plaintiff. On the same day Mr. Templar and Mr. Matejevich spoke
telephonically with regard to various projects. Plaintiffs assert there was therein no indication of termination.

On April 8 of 2013 plaintiffs' counsel met with DGE Director Rebuck, who updated defendants with regard to the meeting, the status of the ICA application, and assured defendants of continuing belief of ICA by June 24. Three days later, on April 11, the DGE apparently confirmed to plaintiffs' counsel that the ICA application was deemed "complete" as of the prior day, April 10, and the new outside date, at least as far plaintiffs were concerned, April - excuse me - August 9th, 2013.

On the very next day, a Friday, April 12, Mr. Templar undertook a telephone call with Mr. Welch regarding the application status. Welch indicated no discussion or offered no discussion about - absent the information request copy. On April 15 of 2000 (sic), a Monday night - this was the next business day plaintiffs agreed to provide the requested information or copies of it to defendants but only upon defendants execution of a non-disclosure agreement, not specifically required per the agreement, arguably required within the more general language as pertains to assurances and good faith participation.

Two days later, on April 17, the defendants signed the non-disclosure agreement, again, not specifically required by the contract but arguably impliedly part of the assurances language and good faith obligation to participate. On April 18th the defendants did receive the non-disclosure agreement. On April 22nd plaintiffs had fully responded - by April 22 nd plaintiffs had fully responded to the defendants' information request.

On April 23 of 2013 Mr. Templar emailed Mr. Welch - that is Exhibit $C$ to the complaint. On April 24 th defense counsel requested confirmation that plaintiff had responded timely to DGE's April 22 deadline for additional information, and that timely response was confirmed. On April 25 Mr . Welch emailed Mr. Templar refusing Mr. Templar's outreach or request for a written amendment to extend the outside date.

On April 25 plaintiffs' counsel met with the DGE and updated Mr. Frawley with regard to the details pertaining to that meeting. On the same date Mr. Templar emailed Mr. Welch stating, "This is what I was hoping you'd come back with." I found that to be an interesting component to that communication.

On the next day, April 26, plaintiffs' counsel contacted defense counsel, offered to have a
conference call with DGE. On the same date Mr. Welch emailed Mr. Templar "in an effort to be constructive, $\$ 6,000,000$ for ten days defendant released from obligation regarding the solicitation of other bids."

On April 27 plaintiffs received the notice to terminate. That's Exhibit E. On May 1 another letter reiterating termination. That's Exhibit F.

And they are ostensibly the facts at least as substantially agreed upon that bring us here, and of course the Court now is duty bound to consider that record; and to the extent that other facts have been discussed between the Court and counsel, counsel with each other, today and are not contested the aggregate record before the Court and apply the four-prong criteria of Crowe v. DeGioia, and I begin with immediate and irreparable harm.

And of course both counsel have acknowledged the inclusion in the subject agreement of a provision which by its terms stipulates that the subject matter of this agreement involves a casino and the unique nature of the real estate, the casino licensure, the real property, the financial interests as so unique that a violation as to - a material violation as to provisions of the agreement would entitle the victim of any such violation to injunctive relief. Counsel
have also briefed, correctly, the extent to which that language to the extent included in a contract is always interesting, and it tends, at least at first blush, to make any judge presiding over a related dispute feel somewhat better in the beginning. It is not binding upon any court, and the court really has an affirmative obligation to consider the nature of the subject matter of the contract and reach an independent determination.

This Court has no difficulty finding anything other than the interests that are the subject of this contract are immeasurably unique. It involves one of limited casino licenses in New Jersey. The only casino gaming site is in New Jersey. It is oceanfront property. I am sufficiently familiar with the oceanfront in Atlantic City to know that. Again, there are just a limited number of casino licenses here in New Jersey, and this transaction was negotiated and consummated mid-sea change in the state of New Jersey as relates to the advent of eGaming, online poker, and the parties to this transaction included, as relates to defendants, ownership interest in a casino that at best was struggling financially at the time. Also included what the pleadings suggest to the Court is, if not the leading on-line poker entity
in the world, certainly one of the leading on-line poker entities, successful at that, in the world. And to the extent that there approaches that sea chain in lawful casino gaming in New Jersey, iGaming, and to the extent that that uniquely successful plaintiff enjoys opportunity to secure an ownership interest lawfully in one of New Jersey's limited casino licenses, the prospect of attempting to measure damages at any point down the road is seemingly difficult if not impossible. I'm not sure how anyone with whatever credentials would be able to sit in this courtroom today, next month, next year and achieve some economic model to attempt to calculate compensatory damages that might be sustained by plaintiffs were they to lose the benefits of their negotiated bargain in this particular contract. I may be wrong, but that's my, that's my instinct at the moment.

As a result the defendants claim that the deal is the deal and consequential damages remain available. They're probably correct in the first instance, but in the latter regard I'm not as certain. In fact, $I$ have severe doubts.

So I do find that the plaintiff faces a very real prospect of immediate and irreparable harm were
the concerns which it has articulated, effectively the sale or attempted sale of this casino interest to a third party were to occur.

Next, are there genuine issues of material fact? If there are, there are not many. The, again, time line of the contract is uncontested. The dates of emails sent and telephonic communications and teleconferences between counsel, not in dispute, and somewhat remarkably so in this Court's view, and I incorporate by reference my factual findings of just a moment ago and, of course, those factual findings are limited to this record as is the entirety of my decision here today.

The balancing of the equities. I have not only heard your arguments today, counsel, but I have also reviewed on several occasions your pleadings, and I am satisfied that I understand your particular positions. The plaintiffs assert that the hardship to be suffered by it should restraints not be continued, substantially more severe than any hardship or harm that would be suffered by defendant consequent to any continuation of the restraints. Plaintiff cites the need for their ongoing ability to conclude administrative review, the survival of the contract if you will and their predictable ability to perform
should the ICA issue. Plaintiffs note that the contract is silent with regard to any negotiated extensions absent a writing signed by all. They express concerns with regard to any uncertainty on the part of the DGE and the Casino Commission should its equitable interest in the casino premises not be preserved by way of restraints.

Defendants also assert that should the restraints continue managerial and financial instability will threaten the viability of the casino itself. They assert a need to market the asset. They note the approach of the summer tourist season. They note the approaching commencement of legalized iGaming in Atlantic City. They assert consequent harm to the public interests. They also raise and articulate the basis for their concern about any likelihood of plaintiffs actually receiving an ICA. It has characterized that prospect as "highly questionable" in plaintiffs' brief. And they claim that any assertion by plaintiffs that continuation of temporary restraints maintains the status quo is "illusory and misleading." Defendants will continue to seek reputational harm should the restraints be continued, and all of the foregoing risk actual destruction to the very subject of the controversy. Continued
restraints would constitute a "devastating blow, almost certainly miss the opportunity to pursue other options prior to the November 13 launch of on-line gaming in New Jersey."

Each argument enjoys merit. Each argument each of the arguments on each side enjoys appeal. The issue, however, is whether or not the benefit that would enure to the plaintiff through continuation of restraints is sufficiently offset or countermanded by the detriment that would predictably visit the defendants, and that is a difficult call for this Court to make, and I share, as I have reviewed the relevant portions of the record in this regard, counsel, it's my sense that whatever the Court's decision on this particular issue, one party suffers harm likely immediate, short- and long-term. I am unable to find any objectively identifiable advantage that would enure to either party. The Court senses that the parties really stand in equipoise here. That's not intended to be a pass on the analysis. That's just the Court's read of the record.

Which then brings us, lastly, to the likelihood of success on the merits, and I've indicated on a couple occasions in oral argument today that I understand the plaintiffs' equitable arguments.

This is a court of equity. And I confess that on May 13th, when $I$ was able to carve a couple hours out of my day upon receipt of the verified complaint and moving papers and $I$ began to read the contract and the terms of the contract, with each page it seemed I had more questions in my own mind than the pleadings and the contract were answering, and I still have some. Please turn the phone off.

The difficulty with the plaintiffs' position at the moment, however, as this Court views it, is that the equitable arguments which do bear such appeal do not find corresponding authority in the agreement. For example, the notion of paying $\$ 11,000,000$ on account of a purchase price on a contract that's executed December 21 by February 1, and facing the prospect of not only losing the 11 million, but potentially having to pay the addition $\$ 4,000,000$ as a termination fee, I've never read anything like it, which really means nothing in terms of legal analysis.

The prospect of missing an outside deadline by three months due to the unpredictable - lack of any other adjective - administrative review process, the Court has its own general sense about that as well. On the other hand, this is an exhaustive detailed contract. It is clearly written to this Court, and
the provisions to that contract about which plaintiff now complains, they're just that, they're the provisions of the contract. The parties negotiated the most brief period of time from execution to first filing to closing date to outside date that state law provides. Does the closing date necessarily correspond to the outside date such that should the administrative process not secure the issuance of the ICA prior to the outside date, that the outside date as a matter of law must be moved? That notion enjoyed real appeal here on May 13th. Unrelated to the four certifications and unrelated to anything other than the Court reading counsels' briefs and the Court's rereview of the very statute, I am satisfied that the construction given that section of our statute, Title 5, by defendant is the legally correct one because otherwise as - I've cited this portion of defense counsels' brief probably twice already. (Reading:) "If plaintiffs are correct and the contract could never be terminated, the parties would be forced to continue in a relationship forever depending on when the regulators deemed the application to be complete."

DGE could deem an application to be incomplete for two years, and that would have the effect of essentially
extending the termination date for a corresponding period of time or even longer.

So for all of those reasons I am not able to find, again, on this record - and I understand it's a limited record - I am not able to find that the plaintiffs on that issue face - enjoy a probability or likelihood of success on the merits; and that analysis on that fourth and final criterion of Crowe v. DeGioia is, in this Court's view, the determinative consideration, and as a result I am compelled to dissolve the restraints, and I'll ask Mr. Curtin to submit an order to that effect. And I would like to have it in language that is mutually agreeable to opposing counsel on Monday morning. I want to get counsel a filed copy of that order as quickly as can be, and it's four minutes before four this afternoon. So I know that today is not a likelihood.

Now there is a complaint that's yet filed, although I understand that defense counsel have yet to file either an answer or a dispositive pleading. So the rules apply in that regard, and I assume we'll hear from - from everyone in due course and timely fashion with that.

I again want to thank counsel for your submissions. I again want to acknowledge that I
realize I pulled you away from your colleagues for the last afternoon of the bar convention.

I also want to acknowledge the people in the courtroom, if you will. We're now approaching two and a half hours on the record in this matter, and you have been wonderfully patient and quiet, and that contributes to the quality of a proceeding beyond what I can tell you.

So with that, to whence ever you now go, travel safely, enjoy the weekend, and I gather we'll see counsel back here -

MR. BROOKS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: - at some point in the near future. We stand adjourned.

MR. MUNDIYA: Thank you, Your Honor.
COURT ATTENDANT: All rise.
THE COURT: Thank you, Sheriff. You can please be at ease if you will. It's going to take me a moment to gather my thoughts here.
(Off the record)

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Agent For: CB Trialscript Service 1606 Adams Avenue Linwood, NJ 08221 Phone/Fax: 609-653-1971

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[^0]:    Cheryl A. Bryson, C.E.T., AD/T CB TRIALSCRIPT SERVICE
    1606 Adams Avenue - Linwood, NJ 08221
    Phone/Fax: 609-653-1971
    Digital Recording By: (Unknown)

